On November 15th, we laced up our dancing shoes, fired up the grill, and came together as a community for an unforgettable evening of fun and music. Our charity Barn Dance was an incredible success, raising an impressive £2,350 for the Children...
Couples who move in together commonly believe that their shares in the property will reflect their respective financial contributions to the purchase price or mortgage. As a High Court ruling made plain, however, such assumptions are often mistaken in that they take no account of the critical distinction between moral and legal obligations.
A man moved into his partner's council-owned property. She was the property's sole tenant and subsequently took out a mortgage so that she could exercise her right to buy it. Both the mortgage and legal title to the property were in her name alone. After the man sold his own home and received an insurance payout, he used more than £40,000 of his own money to pay off the mortgage.
He moved out after the relationship broke down and later launched proceedings. He contended that she held on express or constructive trust for his benefit a proportion of the property that reflected the extent of his financial contribution. His claim was, however, rejected by a judge, who found that the money was a gift and that any promise of repayment was no more than a moral obligation.
Ruling on the man's challenge to that outcome, the Court found that the judge had erred in declining, on procedural grounds, to consider his alternative case that the money was advanced as a loan. However, given the judge's unassailable finding that it was a gift, that failure made no difference to the result of the case. To the extent that there had been a procedural irregularity, the man had suffered no injustice.
There was no evidence of any agreement or arrangement between the couple that the man would be entitled to a share in the property in return for paying off the mortgage. There was no record or written document to that effect and, whether or not the woman felt morally obliged to repay his contribution, there was no fault in the judge's conclusion that there was no common intention to confer on him a legal right to such a share.